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EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE LAW
R. GEORGE WRIGHT†
INTRODUCTION
The quality of discussion and decision making in various
legal contexts often displays substantial departures from the
ideal. This Article points to a useful framework with which to
understand many such departures. The framework in question
also points the way to healthier decision-making processes in the
law and to more substantively defensible outcomes of such legal
decision-making processes.
The framework in question is adopted, with some
modifications, from what contemporary philosophers refer to as
the idea of epistemic peer status, or epistemic peerhood. Very
roughly, an epistemic peer is a person or group who deserves our
recognition as a full contributing partner in group deliberation
and decision making. After introducing some important decisionmaking pathologies in the law, in legal decision making, and in
public policy making in general, the Article presents the crucial
idea of epistemic peerhood.1
In light of the idea of epistemic peerhood, the Article
proceeds to examine legal decision-making processes in various
legal contexts. These contexts include jury deliberation; the role
more specifically of purported religious authority, including
appeal to Scripture, in jury deliberation; debate over the merits
and effects of diversity and affirmative action on university
campuses and elsewhere; and the division of decision-making
authority and proper deference as between federal judges and
administrative agencies. A concluding section then concisely
packages some of the results derived therefrom. The basic
†
Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
1
The term “epistemic” here refers merely to ideas such as evidence, reflection,
deliberation, belief, and ultimate judgment on legal or other matters. More crucially,
this Article endorses an exceptionally broad and inclusive theory and practice of who
should count as one’s epistemic peer.
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theme, and the broad conclusion, is that we would collectively be
better off if we adopted broader, more inclusive views as to who
should count as our epistemic peer. As it turns out, greater
equality and expansiveness in acknowledging others as our
epistemic peers generally pays off for all.
The concept of epistemic peerhood would, of course, be of no
interest if there were no substantial problems on which it might
be usefully brought to bear. As it happens, though, the quality of
our legal discussion and decision making in various contexts
should strike us as distinctly imperfect.2 Epistemic peerhood
issues are intrinsic to this general problem. For example, merely
increasing ideological polarization, along with ignorance of and
disdain for various out groups, often affect our political and legal
decision making.3
Beyond some point, such enhanced
polarization and out-group disdain begin to undermine
fundamental values and institutions, including the rule of law.4

2
For one perspective on an idealized decision-making process, see JURGEN
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 133–34
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 1995) (1983) (“I speak of
communicative action when actors are prepared to harmonize their plans of action
through internal means.”) (emphasis in original).
3
For social and scientific attempts to account for at least some aspects of
ideological polarization, see JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD
PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 100 (2013); JOSHUA GREENE,
MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 9–11
(2014). For brief accounts of Professor Haidt’s main theses, see Gareth Cook, How
Science Explains America’s Great Moral Divide, SCI. AM. (Oct. 2, 2012), https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/how-science-explains-americas-great-moral-divide;
Samuel McNerney, Jonathan Haidt and the Moral Matrix: Breaking Out of Our
Righteous Minds, SCI. AM.: GUEST BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011), https://blogs.scientific
american.com/guest-blog/jonathan-haidt-the-moral-matrix-breaking-out-of-ourrighteous-minds. On the phenomenon of increasing, if not cascading, partisan bias
and animosity, see, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Disturbing Growth of Partisan Bias, WASH.
POST (Dec. 9, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/
09/this-is-your-brain (“If you think most supporters of the opposing party are evil or
stupid, it’s easy to preemptively reject their proposals without giving them any
serious consideration.”). More broadly, “Parties who disagree about matters that are
important to them inevitably feel that the disagreement is the result of the other
party not seeing things objectively and reasonably.” THOMAS GILOVICH & LEE ROSS,
THE WISEST ONE IN THE ROOM: HOW YOU CAN BENEFIT FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY’S
MOST POWERFUL INSIGHTS 199 (2016).
4
For background, see generally R. George Wright, The Magna Carta and the
Contemporary Rule of Law Problem, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 243 (2016)
[hereinafter Wright, Magna Carta]; R. George Wright, The Rule of Law: A Currently
Incoherent Idea That Can Be Redeemed Through Virtue, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125
(2015) [hereinafter Wright, The Rule of Law].
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The key problem in this regard is that the rule of law is
largely a public good, the production or the undermining of which
neither reaps appropriate rewards5 nor pays appropriate
penalties to discrete groups.6 The basic rule of law cannot simply
automatically preserve itself.
Worse, there is no guarantee that political groups will
always adopt the same tradeoff rate between their own
undermining of the rule of law and the further promotion of their
own distinctive political goals. The latter goals, in an era of
intensifying polarization, may take on greater priority over any
incremental damage to the rule of law.7 Our broad legal decisionmaking patterns in this regard may thus intensify the collective
pathology of what is called a “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”8 We may all
depend upon a basic underlying rule of law, but still find
ourselves disinclined to do what is necessary to preserve it over
the long term.
Thus, a legal system with mutual group disdain and lack of
mutual respect still crucially depends upon a sufficient rule of
law, and on other “values for which no strong partisan contends,
but which, nonetheless, are essential to a good society.”9 There is
under such circumstances a sense on the part of many that their
contributing to the maintenance of the rule of law may demand
too much self-restraint in promoting their own sense of justice or
sound public policy.10 Such self-restraint, if it is not promptly,
clearly, and equally matched by one’s political and legal
opponents, often seems to involve one’s disadvantaging and
exploitation by those opponents.11

5

See Wright, Magna Carta, supra note 4, at 256–60.
Id.
7
Even, presumably, if those substantive legal goals are of course ultimately
dependent upon some sufficient rule of law.
8
See Wright, Magna Carta, supra note 4, at 260 n.114. The basic logic of what
is, in our culture, an apparently increasingly severe collective Prisoner’s Dilemma is
classically set forth in ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER’S
DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 111 (1970).
9
Edward Shils, Ideology and Civility, in THE VIRTUE OF CIVILITY: SELECTED
ESSAYS ON LIBERALISM, TRADITION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 25, 50 (Steven Grosby ed.,
1997). Thus, the problem is not resolved merely by the continued existence of some
groups that give higher priority to the rule of law and other increasingly jeopardized
but essential public goods.
10
See Wright, Magna Carta, supra note 4, at 265.
11
Thus, once more, the increasingly severe Prisoner’s Dilemma problem. See id.
at 260 n.114.
6
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One possible perspective on this particular decision-making
pathology might be termed “moralistic.”12 Some groups may, on
this perspective, follow their own policy agenda, but with an
element of what an observer might moralistically call selfindulgence.13 This individual and group self-indulgence validates
the broader observation that “[o]ther things being equal, people
in most cultures believe they are superior to most others in their
group.”14
In terms we elaborate below, this form of self-indulgence
involves a refusal to acknowledge, as one’s epistemic peers,
persons and groups one genuinely ought to so acknowledge.15
Our sense of who counts as our epistemic peer in various legal
contexts commonly tends to be narrow, and insufficiently
inclusive.
In virtue terms, we would be better off with
reasonable “intellectual humility.”16 Epistemic humility would
involve “a disposition not to make unwarranted intellectual
entitlement claims on the basis of one’s (supposed) superiority or
excellence. . . .”17
The effects of out-group epistemic disdain in legal contexts
need not, however, be thought of in narrowly moralistic or
virtuistic terms. Consider the basic problem of insufficient

12

See Wright, The Rule of Law, supra note 4, at 1126.
See generally HEATHER BATTALY, VIRTUE 97 (2015) (crucially distinguishing
epistemic self-indulgence from moral self-indulgence, at least in certain respects).
For further detail on the concept of epistemic self-indulgence, see Heather Battaly,
Epistemic Self-Indulgence, in VIRTUE AND VICE, MORAL AND EPISTEMIC 214, 214
(Heather Battaly, ed. 2010). More broadly, see Heather Horn, Self-Indulgence:
Defining Quality of Our Time?, ATLANTIC (June 21, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.
com/national/archive/2010/06/self-indulgence-defining-quality-of-our-time/340666.
14
RICHARD E. NISBETT, MINDWARE: TOOLS FOR SMART THINKING 198 (2015).
For evidence of related cultural shifts over time, see JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH
CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT 13
(2009).
15
See infra Part I.
16
ROBERT C. ROBERTS & W. JAY WOOD, INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES: AN ESSAY IN
REGULATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 250 (2009).
17
Id. Consider also the instances of mutual epistemic respect, and of what we
refer to as acknowledged broad epistemic peerhood, among a number of Supreme
Court Justices of opposing ideological beliefs, including, reputedly, the relationship
between Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See, e.g., Daniel Politi,
Read Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Touching Statement on Scalia, SLATE (Feb. 14,
2016, 4:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/02/14/read_justice_ruth
_bader_ginsburg_s_touching_statement_on_scalia.html.
13
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acknowledgement of epistemic peerhood18 in light of the more
pragmatic approach of Thomas Hobbes.19 Hobbes classically
holds that:
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of . . . mind; as
that though there be found one man sometimes
manifestly . . . of quicker mind than another; yet when all is
reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not
so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself
any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.20

To those who doubt such claims of overall mental equality,
Hobbes snarkily responds:
That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a
vain conceit of one’s own wisdome, which almost all men think
they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, than all
men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for
concurring with themselves, they approve.21

Whether everyone concurs with Hobbes in this regard is not
ultimately crucial. Something roughly like Hobbes’s approach
may, at a minimum, be required for the sustained viability of a
legal system. Most groups, after all, can generally recognize,
with some accuracy, whether they are being broadly
epistemically disdained by others or not.22
Permanent
acceptance of broad epistemic disdain of one’s group by others is
not to be generally expected. Broad epistemic disdain between
and among substantial groups in a largely knowledge-based
society, or in a broadly representative democracy, does not
promote any reasonably stable legal or social equilibrium.23
More positively, there is certainly much to be said for what
we will call a broad and inclusive acknowledgement of epistemic
peerhood throughout our legal system. To begin with, consider
some of the biases and pathologies affecting public discussion
and decision making that adversely affect the credentialed, the
formally elite, the celebrated, and the powerful, and assuredly
not merely those of lower status. The work of Professor Philip
Tetlock, for example, establishes the tendency of high-status,
18

See infra Part I.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82–83 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1996) (1651).
20
Id. at 82.
21
Id.
22
See generally NISBETT, supra note 14.
23
Id.
19
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credentialed experts to overesteem their own judgments and
predictions, in various important respects.24 In particular, elites
can be susceptible to various decision-making pathologies,
including one form or another of “groupthink,”25 confirmation
bias,26 and motivated reasoning,27 as well as the full range of
classic subconscious defense mechanisms, including denial,28
24
See, e.g., PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT?
HOW CAN WE KNOW? 231–33 (2005); PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER,
SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION (2015). Note also the
tendency of some public intellectuals to produce what Judge Richard Posner has
called “solidarity” goods along with “credence” goods. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL
JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN WE KNOW?, supra, at 232. For a more public
institutionally-focused perspective, see PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS
SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 158 (2014).
25
See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 7 (2d ed. 2013); Robert S. Baron, So Right It’s Wrong:
Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group Decision Making, 37
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219 (2005); What Is Groupthink?,
PSYCHOL. FOR SOC. RESP., http://www.psysr.org/about/pubs_resources/groupthink
%20overview.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2018) (noting in particular that the
groupthink symptoms of “[s]tereotyped views of out-groups—Negative views of
‘enemy’ make effective responses seem unnecessary”). More constructively, see
generally Jane C. Hu, Group Smarts, AEON (Oct. 3, 2016), https://aeon.co/essays/how
-collective-intelligence-overcomes-the-problem-of-groupthink. We need not rely
herein on any relatively narrow or technical meaning of the term “groupthink.” See
DAVID HARDMAN, JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 150 (2009) (“Given the relative paucity of strong evidence for
groupthink, it is perhaps ironic that it has come to occupy such a prominent cultural
position,” which might itself thus be considered an example of groupthink).
26
See, Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998); Ray Nickerson, Confirmation
Bias: A Psychological Phenomenon That Helps Explain Why Pundits Got It Wrong,
CONVERSATION (Nov. 21, 2016, 10:14 PM), https://theconversation.com/confirmationbias-a-psychological-phenomenon-that-helps-explain-why-pundits-got-it-wrong68781 (emphasizing the adverse role of experts’ selectivity of attention); GILOVICH &
ROSS, supra note 3, at 144.
27
See Dan Kahan, What Is Motivated Reasoning and How Does It Work?, SCI. &
RELIGION TODAY (May 4, 2011), www.scienceandreligiontoday.com/2011/05/04/whatis-motivated-reasoning (citing personal needs, ends, and goals as biasing the search
for, evaluation, and other processing of potentially available information, in such a
way as to steer judgments toward identity protection as distinct from genuine
insight, learning, or truth and raising the ironic and further socially damaging
possibility that we may tend to detect motivated reasoning “only in those who
disagree with us”); Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive
Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 407–08 (2013) (focusing in
particular on ideologically motivated reasoning); David P.. Redlawsk et al., The
Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever “Get It”?, 31 POL. PSYCHOL.
563, 563 (2010).
28
For a useful discussion, see ANNA FREUD, 2 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD:
THE EGO AND MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 32 (rev. ed. 1966) (1936); GEORGE E.
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psychological repression,29 regression to less fully mature
development stages,30 displacement and redirection of emotion
and affect,31 projection,32 identification,33 reaction formation,34
and rationalization.35 And it may, importantly, be far easier to
detect such decision-making pathologies in others than in
ourselves and our allies.
Among the effects of these pathologies is a tendency to deny
epistemic peerhood to individuals or groups where it would be
actually appropriate and broadly beneficial in the long term to do
so. A part of a remedy was classically suggested by John Stuart
Mill. Mill argued that a genuine understanding of one’s own
controversial positions requires more than just an abstract
encounter with opposing views.36 For a genuine understanding of
even one’s own views, one must confront counterarguments as
they are articulated not merely hypothetically, by designated
foils, or by devil’s advocates, but by persons—whether elite or
nonelite—who actually hold the beliefs in question.37
There is a possible argument for erring on the side of
overinclusiveness in acknowledging one’s epistemic peers that is
grounded partly in sheer politeness, social civility, amiability,
and ambient pleasantness, even at elite levels.38 But there are,
VAILLANT, EGO MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS AND
RESEARCHERS 7 (1992); PHEBE CRAMER, PROTECTING THE SELF: DEFENSE
MECHANISMS IN ACTION 4 (2006).
29
See FREUD, supra note 28, at 51.
30
See id. at 50.
31
See id. at 32.
32
See CRAMER, supra note 28, at 92 (“[W]e can see extensive use of projection as
a means of ensuring group cohesiveness through the formation of adolescent cliques
and in the functioning of ‘in groups’ and ‘out groups.’ ”).
33
See FREUD, supra note 28, at 43.
34
See id. at 44.
35
See id. at 21.
36
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 41 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press,
1991) (1859).
37
See id. at 42–43. Remarkably, it is reported that the followers of the
eventually widely discredited Soviet agricultural theorist Trofim Lysenko “had never
studied the scientific arguments of their opponents.” VALERY N. SOYFER, LYSENKO
AND THE TRAGEDY OF SOVIET SCIENCE 302 (Leo Gruliow & Rebecca Gruliow trans.,
1994).
38
For specific guidelines for more or less formal academic discussions, see, e.g.,
NYU Guidelines for Respectful Philosophical Discussion, NYU ARTS & SCI.,
https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/departments/philosophy/climate/initiatives/nyuguidelines-for-respectful-philosophical-discussion.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2018);
David Chalmers, Guidelines for Respectful, Constructive, and Inclusive Philosophical
Discussion, CONSC.NET, http://consc.net/norms.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2018);
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crucially, also more substantive grounds for relatively expansive
and inclusive understandings of who should count as one’s
epistemic peer. Better policy discussions; better decision-making
processes; higher motivation to engage in occasionally painful
learning; and better, or more justified, decision-making outcomes
can result from a broadened acknowledgement of epistemic peer
status in others. Generosity and breadth in recognizing and
acknowledging one’s epistemic peers can pay off for all.
For example, the important “constructive controversy”
approach to group learning emphasizes confirming the value and
competence of each group discussion participant,39 among other
considerations. Restricting decision-making group membership
to those who are considered high-status individuals or to one’s
narrowly defined epistemic peers can impair the overall
performance level of the group in question.40 In general, group
homogeneity can impair the quality of group discussion and
decision making. This is partly due to the tendency of groups to
dwell upon and overemphasize information and beliefs that are
already shared, and perhaps known to be shared, by the group
members prior to deliberation.41
Remarkably, decision-making outcomes in legal and other
contexts can often be enhanced by emphasizing the inclusion of
persons and groups with a range of backgrounds and conflicting
Sean Carroll, Norms For Respectful Classroom/Seminar Discussion, PREPOSTEROUS
UNIVERSE (Sept. 9, 2014), www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/09/09/norms.
However, many norms of politeness can be observed even under very narrow
understandings of who qualifies as one’s epistemic peer.
39
See, e.g., David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, Energizing Learning: The
Instructional Power of Conflict, 38 EDUC. RESEARCHER 37, 42–43 (2009). It seems
fair to assume that a norm of avoiding unjustified or imprudent denials of epistemic
peerhood status is related to, but distinct from, most dimensions of political civility.
See generally Robin Stryker et al., What Is Political Incivility?, 83 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 535 (2016). For examples of incivility, see id. at 8 tbl.1 (listing various
forms of incivility, including “[r]efusing to let those with whom one disagrees take
part in a political discussion”).
40
Such cases could encompass instances in which some potential group
members are excluded on grounds of their allegedly falling short of relevant
epistemic peerhood. For general background, see Boris Groysberg et al., Too Many
Cooks Spoil the Broth: How High-Status Individuals Decrease Group Effectiveness,
22 ORG. SCI. 722, 722 (2011); Roderick I. Swaab et al., The Too-Much-Talent Effect:
Team Interdependence Determines When More Talent Is Too Much or Not Enough, 25
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1581, 1587 (2014).
41
See HARDMAN, supra note 25, at 148 (“[D]iscussion tends to focus on
information that was already known and shared by the group prior to any
interaction.”) (internal citation omitted); GILOVICH & ROSS, supra note 3, at 156.
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and unshared experiences. We often reach better results not
from the wisdom of narrow elites, but from the proverbial
“wisdom of crowds.”42
But this is just the beginning. Openness and inclusion, and
most especially, valuing various forms of independence,
contrarianism, dissent, and disparity in constituting a decisionmaking group are often crucial. James Surowiecki minimally
concludes that, “in general, it’s smarter to cast as wide a net as
possible, rather than wasting time figuring out who should be in
the group and who should not.”43 But we can often improve on
the already helpful basic “wisdom of crowds” principle.
Independent-minded, contrarian, and self-identified dissenters in
particular can often make distinctly valuable further
contributions to the quality of legal and other forms of group
decision making.
None of this is to deny the importance of general, across-theboard upgrades in epistemic capabilities and education in
general.44 If we were all more broadly and deeply educated, in
42
See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 31 (2005) (“[I]f you can
assemble a diverse group of people who possess varying degrees of knowledge and
insight, you’re better off entrusting it with major decisions rather than leaving them
in the hands of one or two people, no matter how smart those people are.”).
43
Id. at 276. The “wisdom of crowds” process tends to work only to the degree
that the decision-making group members contribute independently from differing
and uncorrelated backgrounds. See id. at 10; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST
AND SLOW 84 (2011); see also Philip Ball, ‘Wisdom of the Crowd’: The Myths and
Realities, BBC: FUTURE (July 8, 2014), www.bbc.com/future/story/20140708-whencrowd-wisdom-goes-wrong (“[I]t’s better still to add individuals who aren’t simply
independent thinkers but whose views are ‘negatively correlated’—as different as
possible—from the existing members. In order words, diversity trumps
independence.”); Clintin P. Davis-Stober et al., When Is a Crowd Wise?, 1 DECISION
79, 98 (2014) (endorsing a greater emphasis on the value of substantive differences
in judgments than on the independence of those judgments); Dražen Prelec et al., A
Solution to the Single-Question Crowd Wisdom Problem, 541 NATURE, Jan 2017, at
532, 532 (emphasizing further the special value of judgments that the holder
believes to be distinctly minority judgments).
44
For background, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES
AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 161–175 (1995); PIACC 2012/2014 Results,
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/piaac/results/sum
mary.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (providing statistics on U.S. and international
adult competency levels in literacy and numeracy); David Kastberg et al., NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PERFORMANCE OF U.S. 15-YEAR-OLD
STUDENTS IN SCIENCE, READING, AND MATHEMATICS LITERACY IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/2017048.pdf (2016); 2015
Mathematics & Reading Assessments, NATION’S REPORT CARD, www.nations
reportcard.gov/reading_math_2015 (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (providing large
samples of U.S. fourth grade and eighth grade students).
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meaningful ways, the quality of public discussion and decision
making would doubtless tend to improve. A broadened and more
inclusive acknowledgement of who counts as one’s epistemic peer,
as recommended here, does not by itself guarantee that the more
inclusive epistemic peerhood exists at a distinctively high level of
deliberative competence.
The quality, breadth, depth, and
intensity of education, broadly understood, matters as well.
However, these separate concerns, for both broader epistemic
peerhood, as emphasized in this Article, and for stronger
education certainly need not conflict with one another. Either
can inspire the other.
We thus have, at this point, a preliminary sense of the
importance of some possible choices in deciding whose voices and
participation should be taken seriously, as that of our epistemic
peers, in deciding legal questions. This Article addresses these
preliminary understandings in several legal contexts.45 We can
do so most profitably on the basis of a better, fuller, and more
specific understanding of the crucial idea of epistemic peerhood.
It is thus the idea of epistemic peerhood itself that this Article
addresses immediately below.
I.

AN UNDERSTANDING OF EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD SUITABLE FOR
LEGAL CONTEXTS

Deliberation in the law and elsewhere involves a distinctive
kind of thinking style. Deliberation has been described as “quiet,
reflective, open to a wide range of evidence, [and] respectful of
different views.”46 There is thus a deliberative method, involving
“a rational process of weighing the available data, considering
alternative possibilities, arguing about relevance and worthiness,
and then choosing the best policy or person.”47
But deliberation is not simply a way of thinking. There is
also the crucial dimension of membership and status in the
deliberating group.
Openness to evidence and respect for
differing views, along with a desire for the best deliberative

45

See infra Parts II–V.
Michael Walzer, Deliberation, and What Else?, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS:
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 58, 58 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999).
47
Id.
46
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outcome,48 may ultimately be inseparable from appropriate
openness to possible contributors, and appropriate respect for
those persons as fellow deliberators.49
Legal deliberation thus involves questions not only of
method, but of membership, or more precisely of who counts as a
full and respected member of the deliberative community. The
idea of epistemic peerhood is therefore central to any conception
of legal deliberation.50 The idea of epistemic peerhood, actual or
perceived, takes a number of different forms.51 The specialists
themselves take different approaches. “Peerhood” may itself be
variously defined in terms of either sameness,52 equality,53 rough
48

See id.
John Stuart Mill argued, in effect, that the best understanding of particular
arguments and viewpoints may require the active participation of persons actually
holding those views. See supra notes 36–37. In the pure literary realm, consider the
widespread initial doubts as to Sancho Panza’s epistemic peerhood in MIGUEL DE
CERVANTES, DON QUIJOTE 593–98 (Diana De Armas Wilson ed., Burton Raffel
trans., 1999) (1615). The acknowledged epistemic peerhood among distinct groups
has expanded. See GOTTHOLD LESSING, NATHAN THE WISE, act 3, sc. “An Audience
Room in the Sultan’s Palace”; act 3, sc. “The Place of Palms, close to Nathan’s
House” (chronicling the story of a group of Muslims, Christians and Jews as they
overcome initial prejudices, find a common bond, and unite as one unit despite their
diverse religious backgrounds).
50
For the moment, we set aside questions involving the status of persons who
are, are recognized as, or are at least thought to be, our epistemic superiors or our
epistemic inferiors.
51
See, e.g., JONATHAN MATHESON, DISAGREEMENT AND EPISTEMIC PEERS,
OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE 3 (2015), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.
1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935314-e-13?print=pdf.
52
See, e.g., Stewart Cohen, A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View, in THE
EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT: NEW ESSAYS 98, 98 (David Christensen &
Jennifer Lackey eds., 2013) (“When parties to a disagreement have the same
evidence and are equal in their reasoning abilities, they are epistemic peers.”);
Stefan Reining, Peerhood in Deep Religious Disagreements, 52 RELIGIOUS STUD. 403,
403 (2016) (referring to one person’s having “the same or equally good evidence” as
another person, and to being “equally competent . . . in making judgements on the
basis of the kind of evidence in question”); see also Nathan L. King, Disagreement:
What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer Is Hard To Find, 85 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 249, 252 (2012) (epistemic peer status requires having
“the same relevant evidence”); Michael P. Lynch et al., Intellectual Humility in
Public Discourse, UCONN HUMANITIES INST. § 2.2 (2012), http://humilityand
conviction.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1877/2016/09/IHPD-Literature-Rev
iew-revised.pdf (referring briefly to “possessing the same evidence” as a
characteristic of a peer disagreement).
53
See, e.g., MATHESON, supra note 51, at 2 (“[E]pistemic peers are a kind of
epistemic equal. . . . [involving] equality in evidential possession and equality in
evidential processing.”); see also Graham Oppy, Disagreement, 68 INT’L J. FOR PHIL.
& RELIGION 183, 187 (2010) (describing cognitive peers as “cognitive equals,” and
evidential peers as “evidential equals,” in the sense of being “equally well informed”
49
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equality,54 or even incomparability or incommensurability55
between persons, or between groups. In any version of epistemic
peerhood, the focus is on both the possession of, and the broad
ability to process, arguably relevant evidence.
The term
“epistemic,” as in the idea of epistemic peerhood, is here again
merely shorthand for the various elements involved in somehow
obtaining, processing, and assessing the evidence at issue in a
given controversy.56 Issues of epistemic peerhood, or the absence
thereof, can arise in any group decision-making context. Our
focus below is of course on various contexts of legal discussion
and decision making. The key point to bear in mind is that in
such contexts, we are generally better off, overall, with both a
theory and a practice of broad, expansive, and inclusive epistemic
peerhood.

in that area); Benjamin Wald, Dealing with Disagreement: Distinguishing Two Types
of Epistemic Peers, 3 SPONTANEOUS GENERATIONS: J. FOR HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 113,
113 (2009) (describing epistemic peers as “equally well informed and intelligent”
investigators); Richard Rowland, The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement, 12 PHIL.
COMPASS 1 (2017) (distinguishing between equality of epistemic virtues and equality
in one’s chances of correctness on the question at issue).
54
See, e.g., BRYAN FRANCES, DISAGREEMENT 43 (2014) (arguing that if persons
“are roughly equal on all Disagreement Factors, then they are epistemic peers” on
the question at issue) (emphasis omitted). Frances elsewhere lists the
“Disagreement Factors” as involving data, evidence, time, ability, background
knowledge, and the circumstances of investigation. Id. at 26; see also Juan
Comesana, Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement, 49
AM. PHIL. Q. 237, 238 (2012) (“Some philosophers have thought that two subjects are
epistemic peers just in case, roughly, they are approximately equal when it comes to
general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, [and] freedom from
bias . . . .”). Somewhat more broadly, see David Killoren, Moral Intuitions,
Reliability and Disagreement, 4 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 15, 17 (2010) (referring to
differing mixes of epistemic virtues and vices of one person as “just as good” as those
of another person).
55
See Lynch et al., supra note 52, § 2.1, at 10 (referring to “epistemic
incommensurability”). In this context, however, the incommensurability or
noncomparability in question is taken to involve, unfortunately, “a threat to
meaningful public discourse.” Id. Thus, “[i]f we can’t agree on whose methods of
inquiry are correct, then it is hard to see how we could agree whose view of the facts
is correct.” Id. In contrast, we should consider more benign, and indeed positive,
implications of epistemic incommensurability. Difficulties in fully and accurately
communicating our disparate experiences means we should hesitate to downgrade,
let alone dismiss, the value of incomparable lived experiences of other persons and
groups.
56
The term “epistemic” in this area thus refers not so much to knowledge, but
more broadly to matters of evidence, reflection, productive discussion, belief, and
judgment. See supra note 1.
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To begin the analysis, persons or groups can, for our
purposes, clearly be epistemically equal, in the law and
elsewhere, without being epistemically the same.57 Equality in
general need not involve sameness. There are plainly several
dimensions to acquiring, processing, and judging experiences and
evidence. Weaknesses, relative to another person or group, in
any one such dimension may be offset by relative strengths in
some other dimension,58 resulting in net relevant epistemic
equality without sameness.59
But in any typical case of epistemic peerhood, meaningful
judgments of precise epistemic equality will normally be
unavailable. Ordinarily, judgments that persons have either
precisely the same or equal evidence, or that they process
evidence precisely equally well, are unavoidably arbitrary,
contestable, and entirely unnecessary.60 All one needs on this
approach is an idea of rough pragmatic equality, or of
approximate epistemic equality.61
In fact, even the idea of rough or approximate epistemic
equality is itself a bit misleading, however convenient and
typically harmless the idea may be. We might instead more
properly think in terms of what we could call epistemic
incommensurability. Sometimes, two items cannot be put on any
common measuring scale. Epistemic incommensurability, or
incomparability, is clearly not the same thing as epistemic
equality, precise or otherwise.62 As we note below in the context
of campus affirmative action, there may be cases in which the
relevant background experiences of persons and groups cannot be
put, nonarbitrarily, on any common scale, and thereby objectively
57

See, e.g., MATHESON, supra note 51, at 3.
See id.
59
See id. By analogy, two branches of government might have, overall, equal
power, without having the same power in any particular respect. More familiarly, a
baseball pitcher and a baseball position player may be of equal overall value even if
one is clearly better than the other with respect to, say, batting.
60
This seems realistically true even in the extreme case of the evidence
presented to presumed epistemic peer jurors in a criminal or civil trial. See infra
Part II.
61
For the bare pragmatic argument outline, see HOBBES, supra notes 19–21 and
accompanying text. More broadly, one can be a genuine and committed egalitarian
without hopelessly chasing some unattainable concept of precise equality. See R.
George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 L. & INEQ. 1, 16 (2016)
[hereinafter Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality].
62
See R. George Wright, Does Free Speech Jurisprudence Rest on a Mistake?:
Implications of the Commensurability Debate, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 763, 772 (1990).
58
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ranked.63 In such cases of incommensurability of experiences, we
may well be justified in regarding all such persons and groups as,
at a much deeper and more fundamental underlying level,
effectively equals, who bring sensibly-interpreted and valuable
background experiences to the common discussion.64 We might
then rightly treat such incomparable persons or groups as
effective, constructive, or presumptive equals for purposes of
discussion and problem solving.
These assumptions jointly suggest a broad, expansive, and
inclusive view of epistemic peerhood for our purposes. It is
admittedly possible, on the contrary, to instead defend a decisive,
deliberative, and judgment-making role for our presumed
epistemic superiors, or for presumed epistemic elites.65 But as we
have seen, and as we further explore in context below,66 broad,
expansive, inclusive theories and practices of epistemic peerhood
clearly have much, practically and morally, to recommend them.
Some philospohers, contrary to our recommended view,
endorse the idea that epistemic peerhood should be treated as a
rare phenomenon. Such a view actually has little to recommend
it in the context of legal discussion and legal decision making.67
We might be tempted to think of epistemic peerhood as rare, and

63

See infra Part IV.
See Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, supra note 61, at 45–
53 (listing representative theories or defenses, on various grounds, of the
fundamental equality of persons).
65
See, e.g., Daniel A. Bell, Democratic Deliberation: The Problem of
Implementation, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 46, at 70, 74 (“[D]eliberation
is more likely to be effective if the political culture values decision-making by
intellectual elites . . . [b]ecause talented elites with the motivation and the ability to
understand and apply moral principles to complex political controversies . . . are
more likely to engage in constructive deliberations.”); Russell Hardin, Deliberation:
Method, Not Theory, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 46, at 103, 112 (noting
at least on some conceptions, “[i]t is hard to avoid the suspicion that deliberative
democracy is the ‘democracy’ of elite intellectuals”). For contrasting statements of
what we might call epistemic egalitarianism drawn from classic literature, see
DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, THE PRAISE OF FOLLY 127–30 (Clarence H. Miller trans., 2d
ed. 1979) (1511); see also CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE
PERSIAN LETTERS 256 (George R. Healy trans., 1964) (1721) (proffering intellect as
supposedly inversely correlated with attention to details).
66
See infra Parts II–V.
67
See, e.g., King, supra note 52, at 250 (“[P]eer disagreement is rare, and . . . we
rarely have reason to think it obtains in a given case.”); id. at 263 (“When it comes to
issues we tend to care about, it is rare for subjects to find themselves involved in a
genuine disagreement with someone who is, and who they have good reason to
believe is, their epistemic peer.”); see also MATHESON, supra note 51, at 15.
64
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thus as merely a marginal phenomenon, if, among other
considerations, we believed that given a common body of
evidence, disputed legal and policy questions typically have some
single, uniquely right, yet difficult to determine answer.68 In
such cases, we might think of those persons most frequently
endorsing the apparently uniquely right answer as somehow
epistemically superior to the rest of us.
But in most sustained legal and other public controversies, it
can hardly be presumed that any such uniquely right and
evidently ascertainable single answer is available.69 Even if we
dubiously assume, for example, that the jurors in a given case
are all exposed to precisely the same evidence, their reasonable
responses to that evidence, and to the relevant legal instructions,
will quite defensibly vary. This will reflect differences in their
group and individual background experiences, and in their
varying but defensible priorities in addressing the complexities
and unavoidable vagueness of the relevant law.70
We should also appreciate that some entirely legitimate
perspectives may be inherently more difficult to clearly publicly
articulate than other, no more valid, perspectives.71 Persons may
still qualify as epistemic peers, given their available evidence
and their various evidence-processing skills, even if they are not
for this reason equally successful in their ability to clearly
articulate their particular perspective to the far broader public.72
68

See Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum, The Uniqueness Thesis, 11 PHIL.
COMPASS 189, 189 (2016) (“Uniqueness holds, very roughly speaking, that there is a
unique rational response to a given body of evidence.”).
69
Professor Ronald Dworkin is often interpreted to argue that there will
typically exist right answers to most legal disputes. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) (“[R]easonable lawyers and judges will often
disagree about legal rights, just as citizens and statesmen disagree about political
rights.”). But see A.D. Woozley, No Right Answer, 29 PHIL. Q. 25, 25–29 (1979).
70
See Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Moral Disagreement,
38 PHIL. TOPICS 157, 157 (2010) (“Taking moral disagreement seriously is to
appreciate that much disagreement is deep, reasonable, and intractable . . . .”)
Rather more narrowly, baseball managers of equal skill, given the same data, might
reasonably change or not change pitchers at a given time, based on entirely
reasonable differences in their priorities as among various short- and long-term
goals. At the broadest level, “outside of mathematics it is rare that the data is so
conclusive that there is just one conclusion we can draw.” Lynch et al., supra note
52, at 14.
71
See Lynch et al., supra note 52, at 12–13.
72
For a sense of the limits of public articulability as an indicator of the
soundness or wisdom of the perspective at issue, see EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on
the Revolution in France, in 2 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 232 & 451 n.30,
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All of the above considerations, in sum, should contribute to a
sensible reluctance on everyone’s part to deny epistemic peer
status even to many of those persons or groups whose explicit
arguments we may find unfamiliar or obscure, and thus
unpersuasive.
Once we are more generally open to a broad, expansive,
inclusive understanding of who should be considered our
epistemic peer, we should then reassess, in one way or another,
any relevant substantive views we hold that are challenged by
persons to whom we have newly accorded peer epistemic status.73
But even on a presumably discredited and abandoned narrower
view of who counts as our epistemic peer, we should have been
taking some minimal account of the views of those we had
declined to accredit as our epistemic peers.74
The extent to which we should reassess our substantive lawrelated views, in light of the arguments of either new or longacknowledged epistemic peers, is currently being debated by
academic specialists.75 We need not resolve such controversies
233 & 452 n.5 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999). See generally MICHAEL POLANYI,
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958). In the
explicit context of epistemic peerhood, see Jaakko Hirvelä, Is It Safe To Disagree?,
30 RATIO 305, 311 (2017) (“[T]he evidence that we have is often so subtle that we
cannot cite it or bring it to focus, and thus we are often not able to fully disclose our
relevant evidence.”) (citation omitted); Lynch, supra note 52, at 13 (“The inability of
people to be immediately articulate about their judgment does not show that the
judgment is the outcome of non-rational process, or even that they lack reasons for
their view.”). These legitimate inarticulability problems could, to different degrees,
affect both or all sides in a given legal policy debate.
73
The more general problem, and one possible response, are recognized by the
philosopher Henry Sidgwick. Sidgwick assumes, contrary to our suggestion above,
that “if I find any of my judgments . . . in direct conflict with a judgment of some
other mind, there must be error somewhere.” HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF
ETHICS 342 (Dover Publications 7th ed. 1996) (1907). Sidgwick then concludes that
“if I have no more reason to suspect error in the other mind than in my own,
reflective comparison between the two judgments necessarily reduces me
temporarily to a state of neutrality.” Id.
74
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
75
See, e.g., Comesana, supra note 54, at 237 (contrasting “conciliatory” with
“nonconciliatory” approaches to newly discovered disagreements between epistemic
peers); Bryan Frances, Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors, 20
INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 1, 19–20 (2012) (discussing conciliationist approaches); Thomas
Kelly, Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence, in DISAGREEMENT 111, 127
(Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield eds., 2010) (“[M]any of us persist in retaining
views that are explicitly rejected by those over whom we possess no discernible
epistemic advantage”). Of course, we may be overall epistemic peers with someone
with an obviously relevant “blind spot,” if we ourselves have an off-setting or
equalizing blind spot evidently irrelevant to the particular question at issue. See also
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here. But in preparation for the specific legal contextual
discussions of epistemic peerhood below,76 we should briefly
consider several points.
First, while new, or newly discovered, instances of
disagreement on basic legal issues are clearly worthy of our
attention, we in fact rarely confront entirely unfamiliar basic
legal positions, and corresponding basic arguments, opposed to
our own.77 In broad legal policy contexts, we rarely develop fully
our own preferred positions, and only then, at that point, first
discover that our main arguments and conclusions are not
universally shared. More positively, and despite the comforts of
confirmation bias, we tend to sculpt our own views of broad legal
issues in conjunction with our rejection of opposing views. We
typically define ourselves partly in terms of what we are not.
This implies that a phenomenon of great interest to some
contemporary philosophers—how to properly respond to
completely new and unexpected opposition to our views—is
actually of quite limited concern in most important legal policy
contexts.78
Second, in the legal contexts discussed below, we should give
appropriate weight to what we take to be the most damaging
current excesses and deficiencies in the overall process of
recognizing or denying epistemic peerhood.79 If we actually
believe, contrary to our argument herein, that the main relevant
contemporary problem is one of excessive epistemic
egalitarianism, we would presumably, all else equal, then
endorse a relatively narrow understanding of epistemic
Oppy, supra note 53, at 189 (contrasting “conformist or conciliationist” approaches
with “non-conformist or steadfast” approaches); Philip Pettit, When To Defer to
Majority Testimony—And When Not, 66 ANALYSIS 179, 185 (2006) (noting occasions
on which it may be “hazardous to espouse a policy of testimonial deference to a
majority”); Robert Mark Simpson, Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of
Disagreement, 164 PHIL. STUD. 561, 576 (2013) (“In fields like politics, religion,
ethics, and philosophy, most of us are party to disagreements in which we are
unable to identify . . . decisive advantages that we hold over the people who disagree
with us.”). There will also be cases in which expanding the class of those we
acknowledge as epistemic peers tends to reinforce our established substantive views.
See Sanford C. Goldberg, Can Asserting That ‘P’ Improve the Speaker’s Epistemic
Position (And Is That a Good Thing?), 95 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 157, 157 (2017).
76
See infra Parts II–V.
77
See supra note 75.
78
For a sense of this philosophical focus on entirely new, or newly discovered,
disagreements, see supra note 75.
79
See infra Parts II–V.
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peerhood.80 If on the other hand, perhaps for the various reasons
referred to above, we rightly sense that the greater problem is
instead one of the undue denial of epistemic peerhood to one’s
legal and political opponents, we might then encourage persons
to first seek out a broader, less politically selective media
exposure, and then partly on that basis to adopt a broader and
more inclusive understanding of epistemic peerhood.81
Third, and relatedly, our approach to the proper scope of
epistemic peerhood should similarly consider what we take to be
the most severe contemporary excesses and insufficiencies in
what we might call the epistemic vices.82
If we believe,
implausibly, that our primary contemporary problem in these
terms is one of excessive mutual deference, undue indulgence of
our domestic legal and political foes, and excessive open-minded
reflection on the views of others outside our own favored
epistemic circle, then our beliefs as to the proper scope of
epistemic peerhood should be accordingly narrowed.
If in
contrast, we would generally prefer wide adoption of a broader
role for the virtue of epistemic humility, a relatively broad,
inclusive, and encompassing understanding of genuine epistemic
peerhood should be more congenial.83
On this basis, then, let us consider the role of acknowledging
and denying epistemic peerhood, first to fellow jurors in civil and
criminal trials generally, and then in the more specific context of
jury cases in which religious authority is arguably invoked,
before moving to consider other legal contexts.

80
Or, perhaps more distastefully stated, an expansive understanding of one’s
epistemic superiority and the corresponding epistemic inferiority of others.
81
Denial of epistemic peer status to one’s perceived opponents could be both a
cause and an effect of what is referred to as selective exposure to information, with
any associated confirmation biases. For discussion, see, e.g., Silvia KnoblochWesterwick, Selective Exposure and Reinforcement of Attitudes and Partisanship
Before a Presidential Election, 62 J. COMM. 628, 628 (2012). More broadly, see
NATALIE JOMINI STROUD, NICHE NEWS: THE POLITICS OF NEWS CHOICE 14–17, 19
(2011).
82
See supra notes 13, 16. See generally Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard,
Moral and Epistemic Virtues, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 1 (2003); Killoren, supra note 54.
83
See Lynch et al., supra note 52, at 15 (“There is a deep connection between
intellectual humility and meaningful public discourse.”).
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II. EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF JURY
DELIBERATION AND DECISION MAKING
In some sense, the idea of “peerhood” has influenced
adjudicative thinking at least since the Magna Carta of 1215.84 A
jury of one’s peers might, as a matter of history and logic, involve
jurors of the same formal legal status or rank as the defendant.85
This understanding, by itself, would not carry us very far toward
the idea of genuine epistemic peerhood among jurors. But the
Oxford English Dictionary suggests that a “peer” can also be “[a]
person who equals another in natural gifts, ability, or
achievements; the equal in any respect of a person or thing.”86 In
this and similar respects, criminal and civil trial juries can vary
in the extent to which the jurors are, or regard themselves as,
epistemic peers. And the degree of epistemic peerhood, actual
and acknowledged, among jurors could make a difference to the
quality of jury deliberation.
Classically, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel referred to the
jury deliberation process as “an interesting combination of
rational persuasion, sheer social pressure, and the psychological
mechanism by which individual perceptions undergo change
when exposed to group discussion.”87 These processes typically
unfold, however, through one degree or another of a denial on the
part of some jurors of anything like universal epistemic and other
forms of equality.

84
Clause 39 of the Magna Carta requires that imprisonment take place only
pursuant to “lawful [peer] judgment” or “the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA cl. 39.
The Sixth Amendment refers explicitly not to a jury of one’s peers, but to “an
impartial jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Impartiality itself seems to say little about
relations among jury members. The idea of community representativeness at least
begins to address juror relationships for deliberative and decision making purposes.
For background, see Robert C. Walters et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled
Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 319–21, 355 (2005).
85
For some basis for such an approach, see the first definition of “peer” offered
by the Oxford English Dictionary. Peer, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
The Oxford English Dictionary then cites William Blackstone for the principle that
all “[c]ommoners” are peers in the sense that they all lack the status of nobility. See
id. at A.1.a.
86
See id. at A.1.b. By comparison, see the equality-focused understandings of
epistemic peerhood referred to supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
87
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 489 (1966).
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Thus, for example, ratings as to a particular juror’s relative
influence tend to correlate with the level of formal education of
the juror in question.88 The more influential jurors tend also to
be of relatively high socioeconomic status,89 and, even today, to be
male.90 In particular, those jurors selected for the role of
foreperson tend to be better educated,91 Caucasian,92 and male.93
Disproportionate speaking time among jurors during
deliberations tends also to be associated with education,94
occupational status,95 and gender.96
These disparities raise the question of equality of epistemic
status, or the lack thereof, in the context of jury deliberation and
judgment. A part of the problem of anyone’s discounting some
particular fellow juror’s perspective, and of the denial in that
respect of full epistemic peer status, is tied to juror reactions to
what we have called the incomparability or incommensurability
of relevant personal or group experiences.97
It is important in this context to note how jurors who hear
what is nominally the “same” evidence in a given case can
variously react to such evidence.98 Evidently, jurors filter such
trial evidence “through their own experiences, expectations,
values, and beliefs.”99 Such experiences may be unshared, or
even incommensurable, and only imperfectly articulable, but
certainly no less relevant, legitimate, and potentially valuable
under the circumstances.100

88
See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE
166 (2012).
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
See id. at 155.
92
See id.
93
See id. (citing several separate studies).
94
See id.; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in
INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 42, 59 (Reid
Hastie ed., 1993).
95
See DEVINE, supra note 88, at 155.
96
See id.
97
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
98
See Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making: Implications
for and from Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 63, 64 (2011).
99
Id. at 64–65.
100
As the normatively focused philosopher John Rawls broadly observes, “To
some extent . . . the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is
shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total
experiences must always differ.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 56–57 (1993).
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Inevitably, equally legitimate life experiences, and related
group demographic considerations,101 affect the legitimate
No given
inferences, perceptions, and beliefs of jurors.102
individual juror, in all her distinctive and complex particularity,
can simply mirror an entire broader community.103 As we have
seen, typical group decision making, beyond highly technical
contexts, tends to flourish when a wide range of potential
contributors are taken as epistemically worthy.104
In the jury context, it has thus sensibly been concluded that
“the jury cannot perform its fact-finding, interpretative, or
educational functions effectively if it fails to consider the views of
all of its members.”105 Thoroughness in jury deliberations
requires attention to more, rather than fewer, of the empaneled
jurors and their distinct perspectives.106 It is hardly surprising
that thoroughness in such deliberations tends to produce what
are judged to be “legally appropriate” decisions.107
This is not to suggest that the actual course and content of
jury deliberations are entirely a matter of responding to what
other jurors have said, or of filling in perceived conversational
gaps.108 Just knowing that one is serving on a racially diverse
101
See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
659, 663 (2002).
102
Id. at 666.
103
See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 125, 125–26, 129 (noting the distinction between individual juror impartiality and
something like an overall, collective jury impartiality obtained through crosssectional community representation on juries).
104
See generally supra Part I, and perhaps most famously, the “wisdom of
crowds” studies referred to in supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. One
modest limitation, in the jury context, is that pressuring reluctant jurors to speak
may be counterproductive to the degree that reluctant jurors express inaccurate
accounts of the evidence, where those false memories might go uncorrected by other
jurors. See Jessica M. Salerno & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Promise of a
Cognitive Perspective on Jury Deliberation, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 174, 177
(2010).
105
Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE
L.J. 593, 593 (1987).
106
DEVINE, supra note 88, at 165.
107
See id.
108
In particular, the racial composition of a jury can apparently influence juror
perceptions of a case even before actual jury deliberations have begun. See Samuel
R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and
Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997,
1030 (2003); see also Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision
Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597, 597–98 (2006) (noting both direct discussion-
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jury, by itself, can apparently have some effects on juror beliefs.
But these sorts of effects are partly separate from, for example,
the tendency toward greater deliberative thoroughness of racially
diverse juries.109
What we have called a willingness to acknowledge relevant
epistemic peerhood on a broad, inclusive, expansive basis is thus
at the heart of what a number of scholars recommend as the path
to improved jury deliberations and outcomes. Among other
sensible recommendations, jury deliberations should, crucially,
be inclusive and comprehensive.110 Such deliberations should
involve the “active participation of most (if not all) members”111 of
the jury. And jury members collectively should “foster an
environment where . . . belief change is a function of
informational influence as opposed to peer pressure or
factionalism.”112
Below, we briefly consider a more specific context in which a
fundamental threat to broad and meaningful epistemic peerhood
puts the quality of jury deliberations and outcomes at risk.
III. EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD AMONG JURORS AND THE PROBLEM OF
APPEAL TO DISTINCTIVELY RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
Inevitably, jurors bring their deepest convictions on moral
and other matters to jury deliberations. For some jurors, these
convictions will in part be religious in nature. Nor are jurors
always inclined to, or even capable of, translating their religious
and other metaphysical beliefs into terms that count as
sufficiently nonmetaphysical, or that are shared by all other
jurors.113
related effects and other effects of racial diversity on the quality of jury decision
making).
109
See supra note 108.
110
See Dennis J. Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary Examination
in Criminal Juries, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 273, 276 (2007).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
For background, see RAWLS, supra note 100, at 212–54 (defining the scope
and limits of public reason). To some extent, extreme cases can be addressed
through jury instructions, voir dire, and the use of peremptory and for cause
challenges to prospective jurors. For a useful response to Rawls on religion and
public reason, see LENN E. GOODMAN, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND VALUES IN THE
PUBLIC SPHERE 54–84 (2014); see also CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS IN LIBERAL POLITICS 141–50 (2002); ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS
COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 90 (2000); Jeremy Waldron, Isolating Public
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The sheer impossibility of effectively requiring jurors to
check their deepest convictions at the jury room door means that
some distinction between appropriate and inappropriate recourse
to religious beliefs by jurors should be drawn. Finding all juror
speech that is somehow informed, at some level, by religious
beliefs to be legally inappropriate is plainly unrealistic. But this
leaves open a number questions such as the propriety of a juror’s
quoting, accurately or not, from religious texts, or paraphrases
thereof.
If it is unrealistic to distinguish among all such knowing or
perhaps unknowing oral references by jurors, a legal line might
then be drawn at, say, the mere physical presence of a Bible or
comparable religious text, at least in printed form,114 in the jury
room.115 Or the courts might seek to draw the line of legal
permissibility between the mere presence of a Bible, and the
actual use of a Bible.116
As it turns out, though, there is some evidence that the mere
physical presence of a Bible in the jury room may not itself be
without some influence.117 But for our purposes herein, we can
Reasons, in RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM 113, 124–35 (Thom Brooks & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2015).
114
Obviously, religious texts are also commonly accessible via any smartphone
technology to which jurors retain access.
115
Such a possible line is considered and rejected in e.g., United States v. LaraRamirez, 519 F.3d 76, 87–89 (1st Cir. 2008); Ackerman v. State, 737 So. 2d 1145,
1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1991))
(“It is clear . . . that the mere presence of a Bible in the jury room during
deliberations does not require reversal.”), appeal denied, 751 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1999).
But courts often try to draw a line between all “external” influences on deliberations,
and all “internal” such influences. Consider the jury instruction at issue in People v.
Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 425 (Cal. 1992) (barring from the jury room essentially any
writing, but allowing “your background, your heritage, your training” to play a role).
116
See, e.g., Perkins v. State, 144 So. 3d 457, 496 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (“[T]he
use of a Bible during deliberations constitutes an external [and therefore
presumptively improper] influence on the jury.”), cert denied, 144 So. 3d 457 (Ala.
2014). But cf. Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he reading
of Bible passages invites the listener to examine his or her own conscience from
within, [and thus] is not an ‘external’ influence.”), reh’g denied, 444 F.3d 225 (4th
Cir. 2006), cert denied, 549 U.S. 1003 (2006). The decision also declined to
distinguish between reading from the text of a Bible and quoting the Bible from
memory.
117
See Monica K. Miller et al., Bibles in the Jury Room: Psychological Theories
Question Judicial Assumptions, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 579, 604 (2013) (“[O]bjects in
one’s immediate environment can influence behavior.”). More broadly, see NISBETT,
supra note 14, at 34–49 (on the often unrecognized power of seemingly
inconsequential elements of one’s situation or circumstances).
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profitably focus on more overt cases, in which possible effects on
broad epistemic peerhood are more conspicuously implicated.
Thus it has been observed, for example, that “[s]ome jurors
may view biblical texts like the Leviticus passage . . . as a factual
representation of God’s will. . . . [and] as a legal instruction,
issuing from God, requiring a particular and mandatory
punishment for murder.”118
Invoking, preemptively, a
purportedly universally binding divine commandment clearly
raises various questions of epistemic peerhood.
In particular, a juror’s overt assertion of a divine revelation
with regard to defendant guilt or innocence,119 as distinct from,
say, merely generally consulting her conscience, is problematic
from the standpoint of epistemic peerhood. A particular juror’s
settled determination that divine law should override any
conflicting civil law120 only heightens the importance of the
epistemic peerhood issues thereby raised. How is such a juror to
react to the contrary views of other jurors? How could such a
juror take conflicting views seriously? We might refer to these
sorts of cases as involving a preemptive “religious override.”
The problem is thus that a juror’s invoking a supposed
infallible, divinely ordained resolution to a case, civil law to the
contrary, implies a preemptive denial of relevant epistemic
peerhood to one’s fellow jurors, and perhaps a denial of any
meaningful epistemic status at all to distinctly skeptical jurors.
The realistic possibility of relevant persuasion by skeptical fellow
jurors is apparently already ruled out. The otherwise reasonable
relevant reflections of such fellow jurors cannot, generally,
matter.
It is assumed by some current philosophers that basic
religious disputes in general only rarely involve genuine
epistemic peerhood, let alone mutually acknowledged epistemic
peerhood.121 In part, this may be a matter of religious believers

118

People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 632 (Colo. 2005).
See Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20, 48–49 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (citing State v.
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988)) (finding no “outside influence sufficient” to taint
the jury verdict).
120
See Oliver v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding an
external and improper influence on the jury, but no cognizable prejudice to the
defendant therefrom), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1181 (2009).
121
See, e.g., Nathan L. King, Religious Skepticism and Higher-Order Evidence,
in 7 OXFORD STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 126, 130 (Jonathan Kvavig
ed., 2016) (noting that typical cases of religious disagreement are not cases of peer
119
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and nonbelievers fundamentally disagreeing as to what can
properly count as meaningful evidence, or as sound and
permissible reasoning, from one’s premises to a conclusion.122 We
need not take a stand either way on such a broad dispute. It is
still possible for us to argue that epistemic peerhood can exist
and can be mutually acknowledged between religiously-minded
and secularly-minded persons on important legal issues.123
There are important differences between broadly political
and law-related discussions in the public square, and the much
narrower context of the proper functioning of particular civil and
criminal juries. For many religious and metaphysical believers,
the most important broad goal is to obtain what we might call
“epistemic accreditation,” or meaningful access as widely
acknowledged peers to the public square and the broad debates
therein, without any need to crucially distort their message. The
crucial goal is thus often the opportunity to make a dialogic
contribution to ongoing general public discussion, rather than,
even by implication, to impeach or deny the epistemic
competence and peerhood of one’s more secular or less
metaphysically-oriented fellow speakers.
The jury cases noted above thus present crucially different
concerns in an importantly different context.124 If one believes,
as a juror, in one’s distinctive access to specific and binding
instructions from a source one unshakeably takes to be infallible,
such as to override any contrary perspective, then one simply
cannot regard some or many of one’s fellow jurors as epistemic
peers.125 One can wish them well, empathize with them, respect
them as persons, or patiently listen with mere curiosity or for
some other extrinsic reason. But the latter such jurors cannot,
on one’s own assumptions, be rightly recognized in this context
as one’s epistemic peers.

disagreement); see also James Kraft, How Common Are Epistemic Peers in Religious
Disagreement? Nathan King’s Talk at Recent Conference, PHIL. RELIGIOUS
KNOWLEDGE (May 30, 2012), www.philosophical-religious-knowledge.com/2012/05/
30/epistemic-peers; Wald, supra note 53, at 115–16.
122
See supra note 121.
123
See Robert Audi, Religious Reasons and the Liberty of Citizens: The
Integration of the Religious and the Secular in Kent Greenawalt’s Religion and the
Constitution, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 249, 255 (2008).
124
See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.
125
See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.
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Crucially, the legal system in return cannot generally
validate and accommodate such a denial of epistemic peerhood to
some or most of one’s fellow jurors. An individual juror may
believe that a specific divine command—bearing overriding
epistemic authority—requires that the otherwise applicable civil
law be overridden.126 But the civil law cannot, without paradox,
ordain that the civil law itself be thus overridden within the
jurisdiction it claims. Even the phenomenon of principled,
perhaps equal protection-based, jury nullification is, in this
sense, within the contemplation of the broad legal system.127
Whether the law chooses to regard juror reliance on
purported divine revelation as “internal” or “external” to the jury
deliberation,128 the law can hardly choose to validate jury
deliberative processes that explicitly set aside the civil law in all
its breadth and scope. Legal decisions, including decisions as to
defendant guilt or innocence and punishment, may inevitably
incorporate moral, metaphysical, and even, in a loose sense,
religious elements.129 But legal decision making can hardly, as a
matter of due process and logic, simply default, within its own
sphere, to a fundamental rejection of civil law.
The value of broad, inclusive epistemic peerhood is, in the
“religious override” cases, thus reinforced by the most elemental
considerations of due process, fair trials, and the rule of law. As
one court has concluded, “In pluralistic America, the jury room
must remain a place of common ground firmly rooted in law.”130
Beyond the jury context, we now turn to the importance and
value of a similarly broad, encompassing, inclusive approach to
acknowledging epistemic peerhood in the campus affirmative
action and diversity cases referred to immediately below.

126

See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
For background, see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 705, 715 (1995).
128
See supra notes 115–120.
129
Consider the overlap, or the reinforcing effects, of civil and religious
prohibitions of murder, theft, perjury, and other societal harms, as distinct from
esoteric religious dogmas. For an extended defense of the incorporation of moral
considerations into law, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–75 (1986).
130
Robinson v. Polk, 444 F.3d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 2006) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring). A proper epistemic regard for one’s fellow jurors’ insights is linked to
the rule of law and to specific constitutional rights, including Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process rights and Sixth Amendment fair trial rights.
127
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IV. EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF CAMPUS
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY
The college campus environment presents distinctive
possibilities for changes of one’s perspective. Minds are, in
general, more open to change “when individuals find themselves
in a new environment, surrounded by peers of a different
persuasion.”131 This possibility, among others, is recognized in
the major United States Supreme Court judicial cases addressing
issues of campus affirmative action and diversity.
Thus, in the well-known Grutter v. Bollinger law-schooladmissions case, the Supreme Court recognized that “classroom
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting when the students have the
greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”132 More recently, the
Court has endorsed a university admissions goal of seeking “to
provide an academic environment that offers a robust exchange
of ideas, exposure to differing cultures . . . and acquisition of
competencies required of future leaders.”133
In connection with these legal cases, scholars have suggested
that campus discussions involving persons of different races and
different experiential backgrounds, and thus often of different
perspectives and judgments, can “produce the most careful
thinking.”134 As well, “[s]tudents learn more and think in deeper,
more complex ways in a diverse educational environment.”135
These upgrades in the quality of class and campus discussion
are neatly analyzable under the rubric of either acknowledging,
or denying, epistemic peerhood to fellow students and to

131
HOWARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CHANGING
OUR OWN AND OTHER PEOPLE’S MINDS 62 (2004). Professor Gardner refers
specifically to the college campus environment. See id.
132
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).
133
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2211 (2016) (internal
quotations omitted).
134
Expert Report of Kent D. Syverud, U. MICH. ADMISSIONS LAWSUITS,
http://diversity.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/syverud.html (last updated Sept.
5, 2012).
135
Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, U. MICH. ADMISSIONS LAWSUITS,
http://diversity.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/theor.html (last updated Sept. 5,
2012); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in American Higher
Education?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 861, 875–76 (2000) (describing a class of students with
diverse background experiences and perspectives as “a more fertile ground to
cultivate the liberal aptitudes” and as more likely to better develop the “student’s
imaginative powers”).
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prospective students. These processes of acknowledging or
denying epistemic peerhood operate first at the university or
institutional level, including through university admissions
policies, and then at the level of teacher-student, inter-group,
and student-to-student interactions.
Thus, typical forms of racism—whether institutional or
personal, overt or subconscious, subtle or crude, malicious or
paternalistic—amount to unjustifiable denials of epistemic
peerhood in the relevant respects. Such denials are analyzable in
terms of the various distinct approaches to epistemic peerhood
briefly catalogued above.136
For example, a student from a middle-class background
might rightly conclude that students from working-class or
poverty-associated backgrounds will tend not to have literally the
same sorts of experiences, encounters, observations, perspectives,
and inferences as that middle-class student. So if we choose,
improperly, to define epistemic peerhood in terms of as having
the same experiences, and the same experience-processing
capacities, as another person,137 then an unjustified denial of
epistemic peerhood, in the relevant respects, will follow.
But for our purposes, there is no reason to adopt such an
arbitrarily and unrealistically narrow understanding of the
requirements of epistemic peerhood. It would instead be an
improvement, in our legal context, to focus not on sameness, but
on some version of equality of background experiences and
experience processing-capacity.138
The idea of precise equality of background evidence,
experiences, and processing capacities may be, unavoidably, a
remarkably complex inquiry, diminishing its realistic usefulness.
Some of the complexity can be reduced by focusing, more
usefully, not on any version of precise epistemic equality, but
instead on something like rough equality,139 or on practical
epistemic equality for the similarly practical purposes at hand.140

136

See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52.
138
See supra note 53.
139
See supra note 54.
140
For a crude, or at least an openly pragmatic, version of rough interpersonal
equality as the basis for important political inferences, see HOBBES, supra notes 19–
21 and accompanying text.
137
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But in truth, even the idea of rough or approximate equality
as the criterion for epistemic peerhood again may not quite
capture our best sense of the relevant epistemic differences. Do
we wish to say, precisely, that the relevant background
experiences of persons who have grown up in material poverty
and those who have not, or of those who have been subject to
chronic discrimination and those who have not, are roughly
equal, in some genuinely quantitatively measurable sense, even
with some specified margin of error? Would we not thereby
pretend to some degree of neutral and objective measurability
that is really not available?
More appropriate, and with equal or better implications for
the case for broad, encompassing, inclusive epistemic peerhood,
would be a focus instead on what we have called the realistic
noncomparability,
or
incommensurability,
of
relevant
background experiences.141 Such a partial incomparability of
experiences is then set in a largely uncontroversial and more
basic presumption, on one theory or another, of the underlying
more fundamental equality of all persons.142
Consider, by way of loose analogy, that we might want to say
that a certain kind of wisdom and a certain kind of benevolence
are not quantitatively of equal value, or even of roughly equal
value, but instead both of great, but incommensurable, value.
Or, more concretely, we might not want to say that a particular
sculpture and a particular musical composition are
quantitatively equal, or even nearly equal, in artistic value, but
instead that their individual great values cannot be put on some
neutral, objective, common numerical scale.
In the case of the noncomparable virtues, and of the
noncomparable works of art, our sense of noncomparability on
any objective common scale need not and should not leave us in a
position of epistemic skepticism. We need not be left with
arbitrariness. The much better justified approach is instead to
apply our admittedly limited human capacities for empathy,
humility, sensible judgment, and imagination.143 We may then
be more open to the possibility that our own experiences and
those of our neighbors with regard to, say, local police practices,
141

See supra notes 55, 62–64 and accompanying text.
See the substantial literature referred to in Wright, Equal Protection and the
Idea of Equality, supra note 61, at 45–53.
143
See supra notes 55, 62–64 and accompanying text.
142
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public bureaucracies, court systems, credit agencies, lessors,
employment opportunities, physical safety, sales practices, or
health care access and treatment may not be the same, and,
crucially, that our own experiences and perceptions may not be
uniquely legitimate or valuable.
This inclusive approach to epistemic peerhood then
specifically supports various forms of campus pluralism and
diversity as contributing to better, and more informed,
discussion, debate, and broad problem solving. We shall see that
research suggests, for example, that enhanced quality of group
decision making, in our various legal contexts, need not take the
form of the providing of utterly new ideas by diverse group
members. In many instances, a relatively subtle, ongoing,
perhaps awkward, discussion process instead unfolds. In this
process, diverse group members often inspire a greater degree of
group deliberative openness, innovation, conscientiousness,
greater information exchange, and thoroughness in examining
the range of interpretations and perspectives, thoughtfulness,
and generally more defensible deliberative outcomes.144 Such a
process requires the meaningful acknowledgement of and
epistemic respect for persons of different experiential
backgrounds and perspectives.145
To some degree, an open, inclusive, and expansive approach
to recognizing those with different experiential backgrounds as
epistemic peers tracks the basic idea of the “wisdom of crowds”
and the more specifically developed literature on even more
effective group decision making.146 From that literature, we
appreciate that in many problem-solving contexts, a group of
144
See Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCI. AM. (Oct.
1, 2014), www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter. These
effects are not in the slightest confined to discussions of what one would think of as
distinctly racial substantive issues. See, e.g., Better Decisions Through Diversity,
KELLOGG INSIGHT (Oct. 1, 2010), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/
better_decisions_through_diversity; see also Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of
Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking in College Students, STAN. U. (2004),
http://web.stanford.edu/~aantonio/psychsci.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). More
broadly, see Michel Zaitouni & Amani Gaber, Managing Workforce Diversity from
the Perspective of Two Higher Education Institutions, 18 INT’L J. OF BUS. MGMT.
(2017). These effects can to one degree or another be affected by how the decisionmaking group is externally managed. See Fernando Martin-Alcazar et al., Effects of
Diversity on Group Decision-Making Processes: The Moderating Role of Human
Resource Management, 21 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 677 (2012).
145
See Phillips, supra note 144.
146
See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
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diverse, independent, conflicting, contrarian, and dissenting
persons is often likely to outperform a small group of presumably
epistemically elite experts.147 Again, self-identified minority or
dissenting contributors may be of even greater value than merely
independent-minded persons in improving group decision
making.148
In particular, in some cases, additional group decisionmaking accuracy can be gained not by considering anyone’s
degree of confidence in their own judgments, but by giving weight
to a somewhat different consideration.149 Additional accuracy can
sometimes be had by giving some additional weight to the
judgments of persons who believe that their own best judgments
are not likely to correspond to the judgment of the group’s
numerical majority,150 especially where such modest judgments
turn out nonetheless to be more popular than their holders had
expected.151 This partly reflects the more basic fact that on many
questions, some subgroups will have distinctive, legitimate
insights that they reasonably do not expect to be widely shared,
or held by a numerical majority.152
The example the study authors in question actually refer to
involves naming the capital of Pennsylvania.153 As it happens,
typically, more people will answer “Philadelphia,” incorrectly,
than will answer, correctly, “Harrisburg.”154 The basic point is
that people who answer “Philadelphia” will tend to assume that
most other respondents will give the same answer. In contrast,
the limited number of persons whose own answer is “Harrisburg”
will tend, understandably, to anticipate that a substantial
percentage of persons will make the mistake of choosing the
much larger, more famous city of Philadelphia.155 Thus, in part
the contrast between one’s own judgment based on one’s own
147

See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 43.
149
See Dražen Prelec et al., supra note 43, at 533.
150
See id.; Peter Dizikes, Better Wisdom from Crowds, MIT NEWS (Jan. 25,
2017), http://news.mit.edu/2017/algorithm-better-wisdom-crowds-0125. Consider, for
example, the case of a small group of people who believe, correctly, that Carson City,
Nevada is west of Los Angeles, but who also believe that many people would not
agree.
151
See supra notes 149–150.
152
See supra notes 149–150.
153
See Dizikes, supra note 150.
154
See id.
155
See id.
148
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special knowledge and experience, and one’s sense that not many
others, lacking that knowledge and experience, will concur in
one’s own judgment, adds especially distinctive weight and value
to that judgment.
This further refinement, beyond the independence and
especially the contrariness of one’s perspective, has implications
for the extension of epistemic peerhood in the campus affirmative
action and diversity contexts.156 In many important contexts, the
lived experiences, inferences, memories, and judgments of many
minority students will tend to be distinctive, in the sense of being
not widely shared or vividly envisioned by many nonminority
students. And in many such cases, the relevant minority group
members will tend also to believe that their experiences will not
be credited by large numbers of nonminorities.157
Crucially for our current purposes, such experiential
minorities tend to amount as well to a distinct numerical
minority on campus. A relevant campus issue discussion thus
tends to place minority group, and numerical minority
discussants, with distinctive, largely-unshared, experiences, in a
distinctively valuable epistemic position.158
Doubtless the lived experiences of nonminority students in
general are in themselves generally equally valid and legitimate.
But a substantial number of such majority students will also
tend to assume that their basic experiences and inferences
therefrom will be mainstream, and relatively broadly shared, at
least by a numerical majority.159
Their own perspectives,
however legitimate, may thus tend to contribute less to further
enhancing the quality of the basic “wisdom of crowds” decisionmaking process.160 This effect constitutes yet a further reason for
a broad, expansive, inclusive sense of epistemic peerhood in the
contexts of campus affirmative action and diversity.

156

See supra notes 41–43.
See, e.g., Richard Tapia & Cynthia Johnson, Minority Students in Science
and Math: What Universities Still Do Not Understand about Race in America, in
DOCTORAL EDUCATION AND THE FACULTY OF THE FUTURE 123 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg
& Charlotte V. Kuh eds., 2009); EVE FINE & JO HANDELSMAN, WISELI, BENEFITS
AND CHALLENGES OF DIVERSITY IN ACADEMIC SETTINGS, (2d ed., 2010)
https://wiseli.engr.wisc.edu/docs/Benefits_Challenges.pdf.
158
See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text.
159
See Dizikes, supra note 150.
160
See supra notes 41–43, 149–150 and accompanying text.
157
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The case for an expanded sense of epistemic peerhood in
campus discussion contexts operates crucially at individual,
group, and institutional levels.161 A broad acknowledgement of
epistemic peerhood at institutional levels may encourage
individual reassessments of who should count as one’s epistemic
peer as well. But there is also a more direct responsibility for all
individuals, based on the available evidence and on
considerations of fairness, to take the initiative in reexamining
and expanding, where appropriate, their sense of who should
count as an epistemic peer.162
As our final illustrative legal context, we briefly consider
below the appropriate scope of acknowledged epistemic peerhood
in the distinctively different, but certainly important, context of
decision making by administrative agencies and by courts
reviewing agency decision making.
V.

EPISTEMIC PEERHOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISION MAKING

Many issues associated with the relationships between
administrative agency actors and reviewing courts cannot be
reduced to questions of epistemic peerhood. But administrative
law issues increasingly involve remarkable subtlety and
complexity of either a legal or a technical policy-making
nature.163
Questions of epistemic peerhood, actual and
acknowledged, between judges and administrative agency actors
have therefore taken on correspondingly increased importance.
Assumptions as to judicial and agency epistemic peerhood
pervade the various contexts, and the corresponding judicial
tests, of administrative agency decision making. The substance,
and the outcome, of any epistemic comparison between agency
decision makers and reviewing courts will, of course, vary with
the context and the judicial test applied. Epistemic comparisons
of agency decision makers and judges arise within the scope of
any particular judicial test, as well. Questions of the scope and
161

See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.
For a broad endorsement of active, reflective, critical self-awareness and a
willingness to make corrective adjustments in attitudes that may in part reflect
negative group prejudice, see MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND
THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 91–92 (2007).
163
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (stating that the
complexity and scientific nature of often divisive policy issues as one of the reasons
for the need to give great deference to the decisions of administrative agencies).
162
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limits of epistemic peerhood thus recur within and between each
of the familiar legal tests that affect the scope and weight of
decision-making
authority
exercised
by
judges
and
administrative agency actors.164 We see these questions of
epistemic peerhood played out more concretely in the typical
judicial review scenarios referred to below.
The best-known context in which such epistemic peerhood
issues arise is probably Chevron deference cases.165
In
appropriate cases, Chevron calls for substantial judicial deference
to agency decisions.166 This deference is not simply a reflection of
a congressional desire for such deference, but partly a judicial
and even a congressional acknowledgement of the epistemic
peerhood, if not the epistemic superiority in a given context, of
agency decision makers, even in some cases of empirical
uncertainty.
Chevron itself involved interpreting vague statutory
language in an area of technical and policy-consequence
complexity. The path toward optimal air pollution reduction was
disputable, even with partisan politics and interest group
maneuvering somehow set aside.167 Reasonable policy disputes
flourished, even among relevant experts of various sorts.168 In
such a case, we obviously cannot say that judges should
acknowledge a nonexistent agency policy conclusion that is
uncontroversial among all agency experts. But a reasonable
epistemic humility169 counsels, in such cases, an awareness on
the part of reviewing judges that they may genuinely understand
relatively little of a relevant technical nature.170 Or, that they
may know just enough to be unintentionally arbitrary
themselves, if not dangerous, in failing to defer to those

164
See id. at 865–66 (discussing the relative weights of authority to be given to
decisions made by administrative agencies, Congress, and the Judiciary).
165
See id. at 842–45.
166
See id. at 844.
167
See id. at 847.
168
See id. at 863–65.
169
See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
170
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring) (“[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to
guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the
judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision,” as opposed to
judicially requiring appropriately careful agency procedural steps in decision
making), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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administrative agency actors.171 It is those agency actors who are
most likely to eventually develop a more securely justified policy
in the future, if they are left with appropriate experimental
discretion.172
Thus, Chevron deference is in some measure a matter of
contextualized differences between courts and agency personnel
in what is thought to be relevant accumulating experience and
expertise,173 if not in the actual current possession of likely right
answers.174 Thus, for example, even where a court has held an
agency interpretation of a statutory phrase to be reasonable but
not legally required, a later and quite different agency
interpretation
of
that
same
statutory
phrase
will,
understandably, generally control over the judicial determination
of the reasonableness of the prior, now revised agency
interpretation of the statute.175
171

See id. at 66–67 (“[S]ubstantive review of mathematical and scientific
evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable . . . .”). Cf. id. at 68
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (“Our present system of review assumes judges will
acquire whatever technical knowledge is necessary as background for decision of the
legal questions.”). Of course, this latter approach may in some cases involve a touch
of epistemic arrogance. By contrast, see sources cited supra notes 16–17, 70.
172
See Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 67 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
173
For a clear example, see Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191,
2196–97 (2014) (involving a particularly complex statutory scheme involving foreign
affairs). See also FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 232 n.30 (2009) (describing the justifications
for Chevron’s holding based on agency technical expertise and “conservation of
scarce, expensive judicial resources”); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81
MO. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2016) (noting arguments bearing upon agency technical
expertise as well as political accountability). Actually, though, the precise issue may
often not be one of the “absolute” advantage of agencies over courts, but the more
technical “comparative” advantage of either. See R. George Wright, At What Is the
Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged?, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 535, 538 (2013)
[hereinafter Wright, At What Is the Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged?].
174
Where the issue is not so much the reasonableness of an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase, but of choosing among possible
responses to a more free-floating perceived social problem, the courts may similarly
defer to evolving agency experience, if not to demonstrable agency expertise. See,
e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513, 515 (2009) (regarding
an agency’s policy change from a “fleeting expletive” safe harbor rule to a more
contextualized approach, the agency “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction
that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one”)
(emphasis in original).
175
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005). This policy also serves the further value of an agency-controlled,
centralized, national uniformity of interpretation of the particular statutory
language, as distinct from different and conflicting interpretations in different
federal circuits.
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On the other hand, classic Chevron deference176 may not be
granted, or may be judged insufficient to validate an agency’s
judgment, when an agency’s claim to epistemic superiority seems
to the reviewing court to be dubious, as in cases of an agency’s
supposed failure to attempt to explain some policy change,177 or
in cases of unexplained apparent agency irrationality in
interpretation,178 or in cases involving policy questions of unusual
breadth and importance that do not fall uniquely within the
scope of the particular agency’s expertise.179
These
considerations, too, reflect judicial, if not also congressional,
judgments as to the agency’s relative epistemic competence.180
The importance of perceived relative expertise of agencies
and courts is not confined, though, to the Chevron deference
cases. Whether a reviewing court should apply relatively high
level Chevron deference or what is often thought of as a
somewhat lower level of deference to agency judgments can also
sometimes turn on questions of comparative agency expertise
and the complexity of the regulatory process.181
The most typical form of less expansive judicial deference to
agency judgments in these contexts is known as Skidmore
deference.182 Skidmore deference recognizes that some agency

176
Chevron’s step one, as distinguished from Chevron’s step two, does not
involve any reference to an agency’s interpretation of the statute; the focus instead
is on the court’s attempt to determine whether Congress somehow indicated a
specific, unequivocal, nonoverridable intent on the precise interpretive question at
stake in the case. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
177
See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016)
(stating that an unexplained agency interpretive inconsistency is undeserving of
Chevron deference).
178
See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (declaring the
agency’s failure, in the particular statutory context, to consider cost factors to be
unreasonable under Chevron step two and thus undeserving of Chevron deference).
179
See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89, 2483 (2015) (declining to
apply Chevron deference due to a presumed lack of congressional intent to delegate
authority to the IRS to determine the matter at issue, given both the “deep ‘economic
and political significance’ that is central to this statutory scheme,” and the presumed
fact that “the IRS . . . has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this
sort”).
180
But note the ambiguity between an agency’s “absolute advantage” and the
more technical idea of “comparative advantage” in working through a given problem,
or type of problem. For background, see generally Wright, At What Is the Supreme
Court Comparatively Advantaged?, supra note 173.
181
See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); see also Fox v. Clinton, 684
F.3d 67, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
182
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
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judgments may be “based upon more specialized experience and
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a
judge in a particular case.”183 Such cases starkly pose issues of
epistemic peerhood—or of epistemic superiority and inferiority—
between administrative officials and federal judges.
Skidmore, however, then crucially authorizes reviewing
courts to consider, in appropriate cases, the apparent
thoroughness of the agency’s consideration of the matter, the
apparent validity of the agency’s reasoning, and the apparent
consistency or inconsistency of the agency’s judgment on the
particular matter over time.184 The court’s judgment as to the
validity or invalidity of the agency’s reasoning crucially depends
upon that court’s assessment of the presence or absence of their
relevant epistemic peerhood with respect to the agency in
question,185 on any judicial sense of appropriate judicial epistemic
humility,186 and finally on any sense of a lack of relevant agency
competence or expertise.187
Similar epistemic considerations play as well into cases in
which a court is reviewing an agency’s interpretation not of a
congressional statute, but of an agency’s interpretation of the
agency’s own preexisting rule. This is commonly referred to as

183

Id. at 139.
See id.
185
In his account of the relations under Skidmore between agencies and courts,
Professor Vermeule has used the term “epistemic deference.” ADRIAN VERMEULE,
LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 200 (2016).
186
See supra notes 16–17, 70 and accompanying text. For a further sense of the
institutional epistemic comparison often licensed by Skidmore, see United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (under Skidmore, “an agency’s interpretation
may merit some deference whatever its form, given the specialized experience and
broader investigations and information available to the agency”) (internal quotation
omitted); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (on the
judicial obligation to respect agency interpretive judgments, “but only to the extent
that those interpretations have the power to persuade”) (internal quotation omitted).
For a judicial acknowledgement of the value, in some contexts, of administrative
day-to-day expertise, see NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
Note also Hearst’s distinction between broad legal questions on the one hand and
more contextualized, specific questions of applying broad law to distinctive facts on
the other, see id. at 130–31, as well as the Court’s reference elsewhere to the
significance of an agency’s relying, or not relying, in a given case, on its “experience
and peculiar competence,” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943).
187
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006) (granting no judicial
deference to the agency even under Skidmore, given the epistemic factors of the
administrative actor’s “lack of expertise in this area and the apparent absence of any
consultation” outside the agency).
184
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Auer deference.188 Whether to judicially accord Auer deference to
agency interpretations of their own rules may take into account
whether the agency’s underlying regulation involves “a complex
and highly technical regulatory program, in which the
classification of relevant criteria necessarily require significant
expertise.”189 Auer deference, on the other hand, may not be
accorded to an agency interpretation where the court disagrees
with the agency on grounds of constitutional or jurisprudential
principle,190 or on some narrower grounds,191 at least apparently
impeaching the epistemic peerhood or the epistemic virtue of the
agency in a given case.192
In general, and taking all the above contexts into account,
courts and agencies generally would be well advised to broadly
acknowledge each other’s epistemic peerhood within the
constraints of the division of labor envisioned by separation of
powers principles, and by principles of comparative advantage.
This general or presumptive epistemic peerhood of courts and
agencies commonly will not take the form of their epistemic
sameness,193 or of their concrete, substantive epistemic equality194
188

See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl.
Def. Ctr. 568 U.S. 597, 613–14 (2013); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.
50, 59 (2011); Chase Bank, USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 209–10 (2011).
189
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (internal
quotation omitted).
190
See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608–09
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (raising concerns as to possible agency usurpation,
insufficient separation of powers, insufficient decisional predictability, and agency
arbitrariness).
191
See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)
(citing, among other grounds for not according Auer deference, a judicial judgment
that the agency’s own judgment is “plainly erroneous” (quoting Auer, 461 U.S. at
461) and finding in Christopher an unrecognized “unfair surprise” to reasonably
relying regulated parties).
192
It should be noted that issues of judiciary or agency epistemic peerhood can
arise as well, even in cases of constitutional procedural due process when the
fairness, fact-finding adequacy, or even the comparative cost effectiveness of the
agency decision-making process is called into question. See Adrian Vermeule,
Deference and Due Process, Essay, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1893 (2016). For
background, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). But see Forsyth
County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (according far less
procedural due process deference to a local agency’s parade-permitting practices).
Finally, courts will often defer, largely from a sense of epistemic deference, or
reasonable epistemic humility, to many agency choices as to whether to proceed by
general rulemaking or by successive case adjudication. See SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
193
See supra note 52.
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in a given case, or even of rough or approximate equality.195
Instead, agencies and courts take broad epistemic peerhood in
the most interesting form of offsetting realms of relative
expertise, and of what we have called epistemic noncomparability
or incommensurability.196
Thus, the broad epistemic respect owed by agencies and
courts to one another is based largely on the noncomparability of
their diverse perspectives and experiences and their only
partially overlapping realms of relevant and developed expertise.
As a first approximation, for example, we should realistically
expect administrative agencies to focus more on their own
distinct regulatory mission than on how that mission fits with, or
is properly limited by, the broader legal and constitutional
environment. Dedicated agency experts with a given mission
may tend to undervalue broader, big picture considerations.
Agency experts may not also be legal generalists. This is where
reviewing courts should hold an absolute, and perhaps a
comparative, epistemic advantage over even agency experts.197
But as we have also seen throughout this Part, agencies may
bring evolving substantive expertise to a legal issue that cannot
be matched by, or even fully explained to, a generalist reviewing
court. Federal courts of appeal must devote most of their
attention to matters other than administrative law and related
policies. Even when the agency is itself uncertain, at least for
the moment, as to some technical or empirical question, judicial
epistemic humility, and a division of labor based on epistemic
incommensurability, suggest that courts should not typically
override even uncertain, but conscientiously derived, agency
conclusions.
CONCLUSION
This Article has deployed the somewhat technical idea of
epistemic peerhood in the sense, roughly, of persons or groups
who deserve, in context, to be considered full members of a
decision-making community. The idea of epistemic peerhood
illuminates and constructively addresses decision-making
pathologies and inefficiencies in many legal contexts. The
194
195
196
197

See supra note 53.
See supra note 54.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 173.
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primary focus herein has been on civil and criminal jury decision
making in general and cases of juror recourse to purported divine
revelation; campus affirmative action, diversity, and the campus
educational process; and the division of authority between
administrative agencies and courts that review agency decision
making. Reflection on these legal contexts and on the available
empirical evidence has suggested that we are typically best
advised to adopt broad, encompassing, and inclusive approaches
to questions of whom we should recognize, for legal decisionmaking purposes, as our epistemic peers.

